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Abstract Libertarians in the contemporary free will debate find themselves under
attack from two angles. They face the challenge of defending the necessity of indeter-
minism for freedom against the philosophical mainstream position of compatibilism.
And second, they are increasingly forced to argue for the very possibility of inde-
terministic free will, in the face of the so-called luck objection. Many contemporary
libertarians try to overcome the second problem by adopting the causal theory of action
(CTA). We argue that this move at the same time undermines their ability to answer
the first challenge. On the basis of this, we suggest that CTA might be a theory of
action that is biased towards compatibilism. We thus argue that the best strategy for
the libertarian is to insist that intentional action itself requires indeterminism. Recent
agent-causal accounts offer a promising way of developing such an alternative liber-
tarianism, but we argue that they currently suffer from problems similar to the ones we
identify for the event-causalist. If we are correct, then this has an important implication
for the contemporary free will debate: action theory should (once again) take centre
stage.
Keywords Free will · Libertarianism · Causal theory of action · Compatibilism ·
Agent causation




1 Department of Philosophy and Religious Sciences, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13,




In the current free will debate libertarianism, the view that we have free will and that
this requires indeterminism, is a problem-wrought position.1 Libertarians come under
attack from two angles. First, they face the challenge of defending the necessity of
indeterminism for freedom against the philosophical mainstream position of compat-
ibilism. And second, they are increasingly forced to argue for the very possibility of
indeterministic free will against powerful varieties of the so-called luck objection. It is
therefore fair to say that the contemporary libertarian finds herself on the defensive, or
even that she is fighting a rear-guard battle. In this paper, we want to offer a diagnosis
of why the libertarian is in this predicament, and suggest an alternative strategy that
may restore libertarianism to the vanguard of the debate.
In Sect. 2, we give an overview of how libertarians currently try to answer the two
challengeswe identified above. Aswewill see, the standardway to argue for the neces-
sity of indeterminism is by an appeal to van Inwagen’s (1986) famous consequence
argument. Libertarians have devised various responses to the second challenge, that
of defending the possibility of indeterministic free will against the luck objection. We
focus on what many regard as the most promising response that has recently been
clearly formulated by Franklin (2011a). This response insists that luck cannot dimin-
ish an agent’s control over her action because the kind of control at issue is what we
call agential or intentional control. And, Franklin argues, the libertarian can account
for that kind of control in terms of causation by mental states—that is, by adopting
the causal theory of action (CTA).
We believe that there is something about this response to the luck objection that is
essentially correct: it is enough to point out that an agent has intentional control over
an action in order to rule out luck in a freedom-destroying sense. However, we argue
that it is problematic for the libertarian to spell out such intentional control in terms of
CTA because there is a strong tension between rejecting the luck objection on the basis
of CTA on the one hand, and rejecting compatibilism on the basis of the consequence
argument on the other. Now instead of arguing that determinism diminishes agential
control, the libertarian might argue that indeterminism is necessary to enhance that
control sufficiently for an action to be free. In Sect. 4, we argue that the enhancement-
strategy is severely limited.
Thus it seems that the libertarian has painted herself into a corner. By adopting
CTA in response to the second challenge, she undermines her ability to answer the
first challenge. This may seem like good news to the compatibilist, and indeed, it
might be one explanation of the relative unpopularity of libertarianism. However, we
believe that there is more to be said on behalf of the libertarian. In Sect. 5, we focus
on a pervasive but little noticed methodological assumption underlying the free will
debate: that the question in the debate should be what, if anything, must be added to a
mere intentional action in order to render it a free action.We believe the contemporary
libertarian’s problems stem from conformation to this way of conducting the debate.
1 In a large survey among professional philosophers in 2009 only 16.7% of the respondents indicated that
they accepted or leaned towards libertarianism. See Bourget and Chalmers (2014).
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Thus we suggest that the libertarian would be better suited to follow an alternative and
more radical strategy: to reject CTA, and argue that intentional action itself requires
indeterminism. If this is right, it follows that event-causal libertarianism is ultimately
an unstable position.
Given our critical stance on event-causal libertarianism, one might expect that
we have a close ally in agent-causal libertarian accounts. However, we will argue
that most extant agent-causal theories fall into the same trap as the event-causalist:
agent causation is seen as an extra ingredient needed in addition to intentionality. We
then explore the desiderata of an agent-causal theory that might avoid this problem.
Developing such a theory will require more fundamental work in the philosophy of
action. But we can already see that the resultant variety of libertarianism will be, in a
sense we explain, more radical than either event-causal libertarianism ormost varieties
of agent causation.
2 Libertarianism and the free will problem
Philosophical thinking about free will often starts with reflections about determinism.
How can our actions be up to us if it was necessary that we would perform them even
before we have decided what to do? Indeed, as van Inwagen (1986) argues, freedom
and determinism (or liberty and necessity as they were historically called) were once
seen as strict opposites. Thus traditionally the freewill problemwas to reconcile human
freedom with the deterministic workings of nature. The main division in the debate is
therefore between compatibilists, who believe this reconciliation can be achieved, and
incompatibilists, who deny this. These days there exist many sophisticated varieties of
compatibilism, and the incompatibilist therefore has serious work to do in explaining
why she believes free will requires indeterminism. Themost important incompatibilist
argument in the contemporary debate has been van Inwagen’s consequence argument,
which, in its informal formulation,2 runs as follows:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we
were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the
consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (van
Inwagen 1986, p. 16)
What this argument brings out is that a deterministic world view makes it hard to
comprehend howwe can still be the authors of our own actions, or how our actions can
be “up to us”. However, the sense inwhich freewill requires that we control our actions
is, not surprisingly, itself a point of philosophical contention. Hence, compatibilists
can overcome the consequence argument if they show that there is a relevant sense
in which an agent’s acts can be up to her even when the occurrence of these acts is
already determined. We return to the consequence argument, and the question what is
2 For a good overview of the formal renderings of the consequence argument and possible issues with




the right sense of ‘control’, in Sect. 5. For now, it is enough to note that van Inwagen’s
argument remains strongly contended.
However, in recent years it has become increasingly clear that the problem of
free will is not exhausted by worries about determinism. Those incompatibilists who
are libertarians, believing that human actions are undetermined and free, also face a
difficult challenge. For finding out that human actions are not determinedwould not, by
itself, help much in understanding how our actions can be free. In fact, indeterminism
might make it even harder to understand how we can exert control over our own
actions. Indeterminism, some would argue, merely injects randomness into the world.
Hence, if human action is indeterministic, what we do seems to be a mere matter of
chance, similar to the outcome of a dice roll or a coin flip. And if there is anything
we cannot control, it is the outcome of a chancy process. To illustrate this “problem
about luck for libertarians”, or the luck objection as we will call it, Mele (2006) asks
us to imagine two worlds, W1 and W2, that have the exact same laws of nature and up
to now have had the exact same past. Now consider Joe, a free agent that decides to A
in world W1. According to the libertarian, Joe can decide not to A in world W2. The
libertarian, after all, does not believe that the past and the laws of nature fix current
decisions. But, Mele complains:
If there is nothing about Joe’s powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character,
and the like in either world that accounts for this difference, then the difference
seems to be just a matter of luck. (Mele 2006, p. 9)
If our choices are just matters of luck, then what we decide is up to chance, and hence
cannot be up to us. Thus an indeterministic world view alsomakes it hard to understand
how we can be the authors of our own actions, how we can control what we do. Hence
the libertarian is faced with not one, but two challenges. A good libertarian theory of
free will has to (1) explain why indeterminism is necessary for free action, and (2)
explain how free action is possible under indeterminism.
3 Luck, control, and CTA
Let us start by considering theway the libertarian, in the contemporary freewill debate,
has attempted to overcome the luck objection. At first sight, it might seem that the
luck problem is not too hard to escape. Consider Mele’s free agent Joe. In one world
Joe decides to A, and in the other he decides not to A. Now even though there might
be nothing “about Joe’s powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character, and the
like” that explains this difference, we do have one explanation for why Joe A’d in the
one world and did not do so in the other. That is, he decided to A in the one world and
decided not to A in the other. Mele is right that nothing can explain the occurrence
or non-occurrence of A other than Joe’s decision. But this is no argument against the
libertarian, since it is exactly her position that we have this undetermined capacity to
shape the future according to our own decisions.3 Even if this is an adequate reply
to Mele, it unfortunately does not fully repel the luck problem. To bring this out we
3 Randolph (2003, pp. 77–82) offers a reply similar to this.
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should look at perhaps the most poignant explication of the worry that indeterminism
precludes freedom: van Inwagen’s (2000) roll back argument.
Van Inwagen considers Alice, a free agent who is torn between telling the truth and
lying, but in the end tells the truth. If libertarians are right, Alice could also have lied.
Therefore, if God were to roll back the universe to the point right before Alice decided
to tell the truth, and let things proceed again, she might end up lying. Imagine that
God does this a large number of times, say a thousand. Then we would get a certain
ratio of, e.g., three hundred lies to seven hundred truth-tellings. But this makes it seem
that there just is a 70% probability that Alice tells the truth and a 30% chance that
she lies. However, if Alice’s actions are just a matter of chance, then it does not seem
to be something over which she has any control, i.e., her original telling of the truth
was no free action after all.4
What the roll back argument brings out is that the reason why indeterminism threat-
ens freedom is not just that an action might lack an explanation (as Mele’s put it), but
that an agent would lack control over what she decides to do, just as she would lack
control over the outcome of a die roll. The problem van Inwagen sketches directly
threatens Alice’s ability to control what she does by arguing that what she does is a
mere matter of objective probability.5
Franklin (2011a) has recently argued that the libertarian can escape the problem by
endorsing the causal theory of action (CTA). He analyses the roll back argument as
consisting of two basic steps:
1. If human actions are undetermined, then they are a matter of chance.
2. If actions are matter of chance then they are not free.
According to Franklin (1) is obviously correct: “All undetermined actions have an
objective probability of less than 1 of occurring and so all their occurrences are a
matter of chance” (Franklin 2011a, p. 216).6 But he disagrees with (2): the fact that
human actions are a matter of chance does not imply that we have no control over
them, and hence that we are unfree.
4 Recently, Buchak (2013) has argued against this step in van Inwagen’s argument. She argues, to our mind
rightly, that from the fact that after any large number of roll backs, therewill always be some number of truth-
tellings x , and some number of lyings y, it does not follow that there was some objective probability that
Alice would tell the truth. This application of the law of large numbers is only warranted if we already know
that the results in each roll back are due to a stochastic process.We ignore this complication here because the
assumption that a free decision or action has some determinate objective probability is not actually contested
by most contemporary libertarians. In fact, as we will see, many libertarians are positively committed to
this assumption through their adherence to the causal theory of action. So interestingly, it seems that the
first step of the roll back argument is a mistaken way to establish a premise that most libertarians in the
contemporary debate has already granted.
5 Indeed, this is also one of the worries that motivates Mele’s attempt to formulate the luck objection:
As soon as any agent […] judges it best to A, objective probabilities for the various decisions
open to the agent are set […]. Larger probabilities get a correspondingly larger segment of a
tiny indeterministic neural roulette wheel in the agent’s head than do smaller probabilities. A tiny
neural ball bounces along the wheel; its landing in a particular segment is the agent’s making the
corresponding decision. (Mele 2006, p. 8)
6 However, see fn. 4.
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This is where CTA comes into play. According to CTA, intentional actions are dis-
tinguished frommere bodily movements (like the knee reflex) by their causal history.7
Intentional actions are events that are caused, in the right way, by agent-involvingmen-
tal events—this is why the theory is also referred to as ‘event-causalism’.8 Although
proponents of CTA differ in what kind of mental events are supposed to do the caus-
ing (beliefs, desires, commitments, intentions) they generally agree that these mental
events are identical to, or that their contents represent, the agent’s reasons.9 For our
(and Franklin’s) purposes what is important is that on this account of action an agent’s
exercise of agential control over her actions consists in her actions being appropriately
caused by her mental states. An agent does not control the movement of her lower leg
if it is caused by a doctor who strikes her patellar ligament with a reflex hammer, but
she does control the movement if it is caused by, say, her desire to kick the doctor.
Event-causal libertarians add to this story by claiming that the causation involved
in the production of action is non-deterministic causation. Alice, for instance, can
both tell the truth or lie, because both her reasons for truth telling as well as her
reasons for lying could become causally active. Whether Alice tells the truth or lies
is, however, not totally random. It rather is the case that her reasons for each action
come with a certain strength corresponding to their probability of causing the action.
Hence, if Alice has stronger reasons to tell the truth than to lie, this translates into a
higher probability that she will tell the truth compared to her probability of lying. On
the event-causal libertarian’s view then, deciding just is a matter of non-deterministic
causation. The decision to tell the truth consists in the fact that Alice’s reasons for
truth telling cause her action.10 But Alice could also have decided to lie, since there
was an objective probability that Alice’s reasons for lying had become causally active
instead of her reasons for telling the truth. Now it is important to note that whatever
Alice ends up doing, it will always be her reasons—either those for, or those against
telling the truth—that do the causing. Furthermore, since CTA tells us that the exercise
of agential control just consist in an agent’s reasons causing her actions, Alice is in
controlwhatever she ends up doing.Hence,what she does is up to her, and the roll-back
argument loses its bite.
To some this reply may seem unsatisfactory. Schlosser (2014), for instance, argues
that Franklin merely has shown that luck neither threatens Alice’s ability to tell the
truth nor her ability to lie, but that it remains a matter of luck which ability she will
exercise. Alice, he states, “lacks the power or control to exercise either one of the
two abilities such that she can select which alternative to pursue” (Schlosser 2014,
7 CTA is, of course, famously argued for by Davidson (1963).
8 Some recent versions of CTA are not committed to the idea that events are the causes of actions, e.g.
Stout (2010). We believe that the argument of this paper pertains equally to all variants of CTA. Therefore
we will ignore this complication, and focus on the event-causal position, which is also the most prominent
in the free will debate.
9 Not all contemporary proponents of CTA agree that an intentional action must be causally related to
reasons. It might be sufficient if the action is caused by a mere intention. We will ignore this complication
because in the example under consideration Alice is considering her reasons and forming an intention on
the basis of them.
10 Or as Mele put it, the landing of the ball in a particular segment of the neural roulette wheel “is the
agent’s making the corresponding decision” (Mele 2006, p. 8), see fn. 5.
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p. 380). We believe that this complaint betrays a failure to comprehend the role CTA
plays in Franklin’s event-causal libertarianism. CTA provides an account of what
it is for an agent to select one alternative over another. On CTA, there is nothing
more to selecting an alternative than just performing one action instead of another.
Agents thus control which ability they exercise by simply exercising that ability on
the basis of their reasons for exercising it. So we are willing to accept that Franklin
has successfully shown that if CTA is the correct story about agential control, then
there is no ground for the claim that an agent’s action is outside of her control, even
if the causation involved is probabilistic rather than deterministic. However, whether
Franklin’s argument is ultimately a successful reply to the luck objection or not is not
at issue here. For we want to argue that if, or to the extent that, Franklin is correct, this
reply to the challenge of explaining the possibility of indeterministic freedom makes
it very difficult for the libertarian to respond to the first challenge we identified: that
of arguing for the necessity of indeterminism to freedom.
Why does Franklin’s appeal to CTA in order to solve the luck objection backfire?
As we have seen, what does the work in the luck objection is the idea that chance
threatens agential control. The solution is to account for agential control in a way
that shows this idea to be misleading—namely, in terms of causation by an agent’s
reasons. However, the consequence argument—which arguably is the main argument
most libertarians offer to establish the necessity of indeterminism—also relies on
the idea that agential control is undermined, but this time by determinism instead
of by chance. What, then, is there to prevent the compatibilist from arguing against
the consequence argument, analogously to Franklin, that it is mistaken to think that
determinismundermines agential control, because such control just is an action’s being
caused by reason states? For if CTA correctly construes agential control in terms of
the agent’s reasons causing her action, then this does not seem to depend on whether
the causation is deterministic or not.11 Consider Charlie, who inhabits a deterministic
world. It has always been determined, even before Charlie was born, that today at
six, she will go for a drink. The consequence argument questions whether Charlie’s
going for a drink is really up to her if it was already fixed. But with CTA in hand the
compatibilist can argue that the answer to this question depends on the causal route that
leads up to Charlie’s action. If Charlie is remotely controlled by an evil neuroscientist
who steers her to the bar, then her going for a drink is not up to her. But if, on the
other hand, her going to the bar is caused by, say, her own desire for refreshment,
then Charlie did control her action. After all, Charlie’s exercise of agential control just
consists in her reasons causing her action.
The point is even clearer if we remind ourselves that one of van Inwagen’s more
formal renderings of the consequence argument depends crucially on the modal oper-
ator N, which he asks us to read as ‘no one has or had a choice about ____’. The
argument then proceeds as follows. Since no one ever had a choice about the laws of
nature and the initial conditions of the universe, and under determinism, the laws and
past fix any action p, it follows that Np. To establish this conclusion, van Inwagen
employs two famous inference rules. The first is α, which states that p  Np. The
11 Indeed, Davidson himself exploits CTA (together with his doctrine of anomalous monism) to argue for
the compatibility of determinism and mental causation. See Davidson (1970).
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second is the (in)famous rule β, which states that N(p → q),Np  Nq. It seems safe
to say that most of the debate concerning the consequence argument has focused on
the merits of β.12 However, we can now see that arguing against β is not necessary
to challenge van Inwagen’s argument. For we should note that CTA is precisely an
account of the very notion with which N is concerned—the notion of choice, or of
someone’s doing something by choice.13 And on the account that CTA gives of this
notion, it is simply not true that if it is necessary (determined) that p, no one had a
choice about p. For p may be an event caused by an agent’s reasons, and if so, it would
count as the agent’s choice in virtue of that. So it seems that CTA and the prima facie
plausible rule α are at odds. This, it seems, is what John Bishop had in mind when he
argued:
The Consequence Argument is false because the core claim of the Causal Theory
of Action is true. […] if the agent’s behavior, which is the deductive consequence
of these unavoidable states of affairs, is also the causal consequence of the right
kind of states of the agent, the agent’s behavior will fulfil conditions sufficient
for it to count as action. If facts about the remote past cause present behavior via
the right sort of causal chain, the causal consequence of what is unavoidable will
actually constitute a case of something that comes about through agent-control.
(Bishop 1989, p. 57)14
If our argument that CTA deals with both the luck problem and the consequence
argument in one fell swoop holds, then it seems fair to raise the question why many
philosophers in the free will debate keep insisting on the incompatibility of free will
and (in)determinism. As soon as the libertarian accepts CTA, she is left wondering
why she thought that freedom required indeterminism in the first place. In other words,
if the libertarian explains the possibility of free action under indeterminism with the
help of CTA, she is hard pressed to defend the necessity of indeterminism for free
action. CTA simply explains how agents can control their actions in both deterministic
and indeterministic universes. If that is right, it seems that event-causal libertarian-
ism is a paradoxical position.15 But might the event-causal libertarian not justify the
indeterminism requirement in another way? In the next section we will explore that
suggestion.
12 For an overview, see Steward (2012, pp. 26–31).
13 Perhaps this often escapes notice because it seems that the prime analysandum of CTA is intentional
action. And is there not a difference between acting intentionally and making a choice to act? We think
it would be mistaken to separate these two notions so strictly. At least for Davidson (1973), an intention
or action is the conclusion of practical reasoning, and so the result of an agent’s considering the question
what to do—her making a choice. In fact, some varieties of CTA explicitly postulate decision states as
intermediaries between an agent’s reasons and her action.
14 Bishop claims no originality for this line of arguing against the consequence argument but attributes it to
Slote (1982). However, it is Bishop himself who points out the centrality of CTA for compatibilism. In Sects.
2.4–2.5 of his book he even defends his opinion that “a positive case for the falsity of [the consequence
argument] can be achieved only by affirming a suitable version of CTA” (Bishop 1989, p. 59).
15 Similarly, accepting CTA will make it very difficult to consistently defend the luck objection in order to
establish that determinism is positively required for free will.
123
Synthese
4 The problem of enhanced control
We have suggested that the libertarian has painted herself into a corner by her reply
to the luck objection. For that reply offers the compatibilist an easy way out of the
consequence argument. This makes it impossible for the libertarian to argue for the
necessity of indeterminism on the basis of that argument. However, Franklin (2011b)
is hopeful that an argument can be found that shows that the agential control already
available to the compatibilist would be meaningfully improved by indeterminism.
On Franklin’s view, the challenge is to show that freedom requires such enhanced
control. It is important to see how this contrasts with a suggestion by Mele (2006),
who has argued that the libertarian might even grant that freedom does not require
more control than is available under determinism. Still, Mele proposes, indeterminism
might play a meaningfully enhancing role. According to the position he calls “soft
libertarianism”, the majority of our actions might be deterministically caused, and
nevertheless free. But, he claims, we might still take our actions to have a more
valuable freedom if they were undetermined:
Unlike hard libertarians, soft libertarians leave it open that determinism is com-
patible with our actions’ being up to us in a way conducive to freedom and
moral responsibility. However, they believe that a more desirable freedom and
moral responsibility require that our actions not be parts of the unfolding of
deterministic chains of events that were in progress even before we were born. If
soft libertarians can view themselves as making some choices or decisions that
are not deterministically caused […] then they can view themselves as initiating
some causal processes that are not intermediate links in a long deterministic
causal chain extending back near the big bang. (Mele 2006, p. 97)
There are two things to observe about Mele’s strategy for defending the requirement
of indeterminism. First, if soft libertarianism possibly allows the compatibility of
freedom and determinism, it is questionable to what extent soft libertarianism is a
form of libertarianism at all.
Second, even if we grant that it may be a position related to libertarianism, we
should note how weak the soft libertarian’s reason for preferring indeterminism is.
The argument Mele offers for valuing undetermined actions over determined ones
seems to run in a very small circle. He says that it is desirable for an agent that her
action is undetermined because she can then view it as a “causal process that is not an
intermediate link in a deterministic causal chain”. But that is just to say that she can
view her action as something that is, precisely, undetermined. Mele’s suggestion, then,
seems to come down to the thought that indeterminism is valuable for indeterminism’s
sake.
Now Franklin believes he can give a superior solution to the problem of enhanced
control, that firmly sticks to libertarianism. To do so, he proposes an ‘argument from
opportunity’:
It is often mistakenly assumed that an agent’s control is wholly exhausted by the
agent’s powers and abilities. I argue, however, that control is constituted not just
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by what we have the ability to do, but also by what we have the opportunity to
do. (Franklin 2011b, p. 687)
Franklin makes it very clear that he intends the notion of an opportunity to be very
robust. That is, what it is for agent to have the opportunity to do X is not, merely that
she will do or would have done X if she decides to do it or had so decided. Neither
is it the case that an agent has the opportunity to do X if she only believes or thinks
that she can do X , i.e. an opportunity is not a doxastic possibility. Rather, for an agent
to have the opportunity to do X means that it is really possible for her to do it. Now
Franklin argues at length that deterministic agents never have the opportunity to do
otherwise. In an indeterministic universe, agents would thus have more opportunities,
and hence more control.
However, the thesis that deterministic agents never have the opportunity to do
otherwise seems to be true just in virtue of the way that the notion of an opportunity
has been defined: if an opportunity to do X is the ‘real possibility’ of doing X , it is just
the very definition of determinism that an agent never has more than one opportunity.
That, of course, does not yet give us any reason for thinking that having multiple
opportunities—i.e., indeterminism—is relevant to control. Given Franklin’s criticism
of Mele, it is surprising to see how little he can offer in defence of that idea:
The opportunity to do otherwise is not simply another opportunity on top of
the many opportunities that compatibilist agents already possess. Rather, it is a
significant addition. It affords agents with the opportunity to direct their lives in
more than one way, to author how their lives unfold, and to choose from among
several causally open options, thereby taking a stand on the kind of person they
will become. This is no trivial addition. Indeterminism, therefore, is relevant to
enhancing control because its existence is necessary for agents to possess the
freedom to do otherwise. (Franklin 2011b, p. 704)
This seems to say that indeterminism is a necessary requirement of free will because
its existence is necessary for agents to possess the opportunity to do otherwise. But
the opportunity to do otherwise just is the real possibility to do otherwise, and that
just is the presence of indeterminism. So we are again tracing a small circle.
Franklin then calls having multiple opportunities a “significant addition”, because
without it agents could not “choose from among several causally open options”. But
again, that is obviously circular: for several options for action to be causally open just
is for them to be physically undetermined, and hence cannot be a reason for insisting
on indeterminism. And the rhetorical evocation of the significance of “taking a stand
on the kind of person [an agent] will become” is hollow—the compatibilist will agree,
but simply give a deterministic interpretation.16
Also notice that, even if he was able to show that having multiple opportunities
is really control-enhancing, Franklin would still need an argument to show that only
agents who possess such enhanced control are free. Otherwise, his position would
16 Indeed, there is no lack of compatibilist accounts of what it means to ‘take a stand’ in this way. Many
compatibilists argue that such self-determination or authenticity, rather than indeterminism, is what we
should really care about. See, e.g., Frankfurt (1971).
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collapse into Mele’s soft libertarianism. But Franklin offers no argument to think
that enhanced control, as he construes it, would be a necessary requirement of free
will, above the agential control already provided by CTA. Thus the argument for
the necessity of indeterminism on the ground that it is freedom enhancing remains
unconvincing.
5 Intentional action and freedom
In the previous section we have argued that both Franklin andMele do not give a satis-
factory answer to the problem of enhanced control. This, of course, does not establish
that no such answer can be given whatsoever, but we believe the difficult situation
the libertarian finds herself in should give us pause. Although the compatibilist will
see this difficulty as good news, we believe that there is more to be said on behalf
of the libertarian. In particular, we suggest we need to reflect on the specific assump-
tion about the role that indeterminism plays in contemporary libertarian accounts. We
argue that this will help to uncover a more fruitful strategy for the libertarian.
Indeterminism, for the event-causal libertarian, plays the role of an extra ingredient
needed for “transforming a mere action into a free action” (Franklin 2011a, p. 203).17
On this picture, free actions are a subset of the larger class of (intentional) actions—a
subset that fulfils some extra conditions. And the class of intentional actions is, pre-
sumably, marked off from the yet larger class of bodily movements by other criteria.18
Philosophers who talk about such a transformative ingredient thus believe that the
difference between a free and an unfree action only depends on factors extrinsic to the
action’s intentionality. Traditional compatibilists, for instance, argue that an agent’s
intentional action is free if she is not coerced to perform it.
But it is important to note that this way of construing the free will debate—as
a search for the requisite extra features that turn mere intentional action into free
action—is optional. The easiest way to see this is by comparing it with a differ-
ent kind of compatibilist account, which takes freedom to be an intrinsic feature of
intentional action. The thought that free will does not require anything in addition to
intentionality—that it is inherent to intentionality itself—has been defended by Don-
ald Davidson, the contemporary progenitor of CTA. In his ‘Freedom toAct’, Davidson
tries to analyse ‘A is free to do x’ as ‘he would do x intentionally if he had attitudes
that rationalised his doing x’ (Davidson 1973, p. 148). In other words, the freedom
to do something just lies in the ability—or as he calls it, “causal power”—to do it
intentionally. Although Davidson ultimately rejects this specific analysis because the
problem of deviant causation makes it impossible to empirically identify the causal
conditions of intentional action, he believes that this is “no obstacle to the view that
freedom to act is a causal power of the agent” (Davidson 1973, p. 155). It seems, then,
that Davidson believed that there is no more to free will than the ability to act on the
17 That this is also the case for the other major family of libertarian accounts—the so-called agent-causal
theories—we will argue in Sect. 6.
18 We do not mean to suggest that there cannot be mental intentional actions that do not involve bodily
movement. If one wants to affirm that possibility, ‘bodily movement’ here should be read in a broad sense,
as possibly including, e.g., neural activity.
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(causal) basis of one’s own reasons. And on his account, being caused to act by one’s
own reasons is what intentional action consists in.
If we assume that Davidson was right that intentional action is intrinsically free,
this opens up an intriguing new perspective on the free will debate, and in particular on
the predicament of the libertarian. For if CTA, as an account of agential control, just
is an account of freedom, then it would seem that adopting CTA already is to answer
the question whether freedom and determinism are compatible in the affirmative (as
Davidson indeed insists). That would explain why the event-causal libertarian’s appeal
to CTA as a response to the luck objection backfires by making it impossible to argue
for the necessity of indeterminism: she is looking for reasons to demand indetermin-
ism after having already bought into a compatibilist theory of action.19 Or to put it
differently, the problem of the libertarian in the current debate is that she construes
free action as follows:
An action is free iff:
1. The action was performed for a reason, and
2. The action was not predetermined.
However, on the account of acting for a reason the contemporary libertarian accepts
condition (2) is logically independent of condition (1): there is nothing in the notion
of causation by reason-states which excludes determinism.
If this diagnosis is correct, it suggests a more fruitful strategy for the libertar-
ian. First, she should reject the idea that freedom consists in extrinsic features of
intentional action, and agree with Davidson that intentional, agential control just is
freedom. Second, she should reject CTA as an inherently compatibilist theory of such
agential control. Finally, she should offer an alternative theory of action, which shows
intentional action to be incompatible with determinism. She should not just be an
incompatibilist about free will and determinism, but rather about agency and deter-
minism. That is, the libertarian should not believe that determinism diminishes control
(or that indeterminism enhances it), but that determinism destroys control.
6 Libertarianism and agent causation
We have so far argued that the game for the libertarian becomes very difficult as soon
as she accepts the intrinsically compatibilist causal theory of action. We therefore
believe that libertarian thus should seek refuge with an altogether different account of
action. In recent years just such an alternative to event-causalism has been (re-)gaining
popularity. We are, of course, talking about agent-causalism. Unfortunately, we will
argue, the main agent-causal theories in the current free will debate fall into the same
trap as their event-causal counterparts: they propose agent causation as a mere extra
factor that turns intentional action into free action. Therefore they, too, are unable to
19 This diagnosis of the libertarian predicament nicely aligns with the observation in Sect. 3 that libertarians
who accept CTA in order to solve the luck problem can no longer consistently accept the consequence
argument. It is no accident that Bishop, who as we have seen argued against the consequence argument on
the basis of CTA, also endorses the idea that freedom is intrinsic to intentional action.
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argue for the necessity of indeterminism. Nevertheless, we believe that if this pitfall is
avoided, agent-causalism might in principle provide the agency incompatibilism the
radical libertarian aims for.
Agent-causalism is the view that free actions, or the volitions leading up to them, are
directly brought about by the agent. Such agent causation is radically different fromand
cannot be reduced to event-causation. The reason why agent-causalism is especially
appealing to the libertarian is that it, prima facie, nicely captures and explains how
human actions are not predetermined. An agent, it is argued, is not the kind of thing
that can itself be caused (although events involving the agent, like her birth, can be).
Therefore when an agent causes her action or volition, she is “in a strict and literal
sense” (Clarke 2003, p. 134) the ultimate source or un-caused cause of the event. In
this way agent-caused actions are truly up to the agent and therefore free.
Of course the major challenge for the agent-causalist is to explain this irreducible
notion of agent causation.Many philosophers think that the concept of agent causation
is utterly impenetrable. Appealing to that concept to clear up the mystery of free will
seems nothingmore than “giving a name to amystery” (Nagel 1986, p. 115).20 Adding
to the obscurity is the fact that agent-causalists traditionally have alluded to the nature
of agent causation by contrasting it with the causality exhibited in the inanimate
world.21 For this reason agent causalism has long been seen as an untenable position.
In recent years however, some have argued that agent causation is not as strangely
unique as it might prima facie seem. O’Connor (2009) for instance, defends a view of
agent causation in terms of powers. An agent exercises her power to act, just like, for
instance, water can exercise its power to dissolve salt. The agent causation involved
in free acting, he argues, is no more mysterious than the causation involved in the
manifestations of the powers of inanimate objects. Clarke (2003, pp. 185–218) and
Lowe (2008, pp. 143–147) similarly argue that agent causation (or rather substance-
causation, as it is called when we consider the powers of non-rational or inanimate
objects) might actually be a ubiquitous phenomenon.
We will not here discuss whether this strategy of demystifying the concept of agent
causation is successful or not. What we want to point out is a tension between this idea
of substance causation as a pervasive natural phenomenon and the idea that it provides
agents with freedom. For if inanimate, impersonal entities can also exercise substance-
causation, then they too seem to be the strict and literal sources of their effects. But
no one, of course, wants to claim that, say, the dissociation of salt is something that
is up to the water in the sense that is relevant to free will. Hence it seems that the fact
that an action (or any other event) is substance-caused is logically independent from
it being under the agent’s agential control.
And indeed, the main contemporary agent-causalists explicitely think of agent
causation in separation from intentionality. O’Connor, for instance, writes: “Agent
20 Agent causation is even said to be “more puzzling than the problem it is supposed to be a solution to”
(van Inwagen 1986, p. 151).
21 Thomas Reid, who developed an early modern theory of agent causation, for example writes in a letter
to Lord Kames: “I am not able to form any distinct conception of active power but such as I find in myself
[…] But, if there is anything in an unthinking inanimate being that can be called active power, I know not
what it is, and cannot reason about it” (Reid 1895/1983, p. 59).
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causation is a necessary feature of freely chosen activity, even though theremay be pos-
sible forms of intentional activity that lack it altogether” (O’Connor 2011, p. 311).22
Clarke (2003, pp. 133–150) even argues that we must supplement the agent-causal
account of the causation of action with the standard event-causal account of act-
ing for reasons, i.e. CTA. If our arguments so far have been correct, then accepting
CTA should be a non-starter for libertarians because it is an inherently compatibilist
theory.
Thus the main contemporary versions of agent-causalism do not provide us with
the alternative account of action that we believe the libertarian requires. It is thus better
to understand agent causation as an answer to the problem of enhanced control. This
is sometimes explicitly the purpose of agent-causal theories, for instance in Clarke
(2003, p. 93).23 But it seems that agent causation is not really that enhancing, for, as
we have seen, it also is exhibited in inanimate processes.
A further problem for the agent-causal libertarian is that there is no good reason
to suppose that substance causation cannot be deterministic. The dissociation of salt,
for instance seems to be a deterministic process. And indeed the idea of deterministic
agent causation has been recently defended by compatibilists.24 Hence, even if agent
causation is necessary for free will, the agent-causal libertarian still needs a separate
argument for the necessity of indeterminism. We can conclude that the contemporary
agent-causal libertarian is in a predicament similar to that of her event-causal counter-
part. To argue for the possibility of agent-causation she defends that it is a phenomenon
present everywhere, even in deterministic parts of nature. But this potentially under-
mines her argument for the claim that the agent-causation of free action has to be
necessarily indeterministic.25
We believe that the root of the problem is that the contemporary agent-causal
libertarian, just like the event-causalist, construes free action decompositionally.
But instead of two logically independent requirements the agent-causalist has
three:
An action is free iff:
1. The action was performed for a reason,
2. The action was not predetermined, and
3. The action was agent-caused.
It seems to us that the agent-causal libertarian has trouble motivating the need for
any of these requirements precisely because she views them as independent. But we
22 More recently O’Connor (2014) has suggested that all causation is substance-causation, which would
imply that there cannot be intentional activity that lacks substance causal features. However, if all causation
is substance causation then that makes our worry that substance-causal sourcehood does not satisfactorily
capture agential control all the more pressing.
23 Similarly, when O’Connor argues for agent-causalism over event-causalism he writes: “While agents,
on [the event-causal libertarian] account, do not have any less control over what they do than agents in a
corresponding deterministic scenario, they also do not have more” (Jacobs and O’Connor 2013, p. 179).
24 See, e.g., Markosian (2012).
25 Of course, at this point the agent-causalistmight seek to argue for indeterminismon independent grounds.
But as we have tried to show in Sect. 4 current arguments for the claim that indeterminism enhances control
are not very promising.
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believe that there is no principled reason to do so. As a matter of fact, Helen Steward
has recently defended an agent causal theory that unifies requirement 2 and 3. Her
theory starts from the idea that agents (including animal agents) can cause things by
moving themselves. According to Steward, when an agent moves herself she is by
definition not moved by something else, and therefore her self-movements are up to
her. Thus the very idea that a movement can be up to an animal is incompatible with
determinism; for to say that something is up to an animal is to say that the animal can
settle that matter. And it is impossible to settle something that has already been settled
before. Therefore, Steward argues, if there is to be agency at all, the past and laws
of nature cannot already fix what the agent does. Hence demand (2) and (3), are not
independent: the requirement that an action is agent-caused contains the requirement
that it is not pre-determined. Steward thus defends a form of ‘agency incompatibilism’,
the position that we, at the end of the last section, proposed is the most promising for
libertarians. However, we believe that Steward’s account ultimately runs into trouble
because she does not explain how indeterministic agent causation and acting for a
reason hang together. In other words, it fails because she does not engage with action
theory.
First of all, even if agent causation essentially involves settling the undetermined,
then this would still not be sufficient for free will. For if it were, then a radium atom
that by decaying settles the clicking of a Geiger counter would also be free. Perhaps
Steward can object to this that the radium atom does not really agent-cause the decay
in the same way as animals cause their self-movements, if decay is an agent/substance
causal process at all. And indeed Steward admits that she needs to say more about the
nature of settling in order to “sustain the idea that an animal may be truly in charge
of what it does” (Steward 2012, p. 198). She does so by fleshing out her particular
views on agent causation. Agent causation, on her account, is a form of top-down
control. An agent’s input does not happen prior to the neuronal processes that initiate
her movement, nor is it identifiable with these neuronal processes. Rather, the role of
the agent is to monitor and control the entire process of action. But in order to render
this idea of top-down causation plausible she, similar to O’Connor and Clarke, argues
that it is present everywhere in nature:
For example, a cell is a structure that, once formed, can be a source of control over
the chemical processes that go on within it in the sense that laws and principles
that belong to the level of the cell overtake those that belong to the level of
the molecule when it comes to understanding how those lower-level processes
are integrated and harmonised to serve the purposes of the cell. (Steward 2012,
p. 245)
The problem with this approach is that if being in charge of what you do consists in
top-down control, and a cell can also exhibit top-down control, then it again becomes
unclear why agent causation requires indeterminism. For it is not clear that the behav-
iour of an individual cell needs to be indeterministic. And even if one does want to
argue that all biological processes involve indeterminism, the problem remains. For
Steward believes that top down control is also exhibited in processes that clearly seem
deterministic, such as the motions of water molecules in a whirlpool or the persis-
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tence of familiar objects. Hence, it seems that, by pointing out that top-down agent
causation occurs everywhere in nature, Steward again severs the connection between
requirement (2) and (3).26
Perhaps the agency incompatibilist can find a way out of this conundrum if she
explains how the causation involved in agency is different from the top-down control
that is exercised by other entities. The key difference, we believe, is that agents control
theirmovements by acting on the basis of reasons. Steward cannot distinguish between
free action and ‘mere’ top-down causation in this way, since she denies that only
purposive actions can be self-movements or settlings.27 That, we think, is a mistake.
If agent-causalism holds a promise for the radical libertarian, she is challenged to give
an agent-causal account of what it is to act for a reason. It will not do to outsource
the question what it is to act for reasons to CTA, as e.g. Clarke does. Nor will it do to
leave that question open, as Steward does. Rather, the libertarian will have to explain
how requirements (2) and (3) are conceptually connected to (1). Unfortunately, we
cannot here develop an account of agency that would satisfy these desiderata. And it
remains an open question whether this is possible.28 But nevertheless we think that
the arguments in this paper have considerable potential to move the debate forward.
For, if we are right, the best hope to develop a convincing libertarian theory lies in the
pursuit of a theory of action as already involving indeterminism—and not in the quest
to show that indeterminism allows for slightly more control than the compatibilist can
already offer.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we started out by sketching the predicament the contemporary libertarian
is in: she has to fight a two-front battle, arguing for both the necessity of indeterminism
to free action and the possibility of indeterministic free action. We have argued that if
the libertarian accepts CTA to fight on the latter front she weakens her position on the
former. The problem for such an event-causal libertarian, we have argued, is that she
just views indeterminism as a condition that is logically independent from agential
control. It might be thought that those who reject event-causal libertarianism in favour
of agent-causalism do a better job. But they too cannot escape the predicament as long
as they defend that agent-causalism is a requirement of free will that is independent
of indeterminism and agential control.
26 Indeed many have wondered why settling would essentially involve indeterminism and have therefore
proposed deterministic accounts of settling. See, e.g., Broadie (2013).
27 Steward instead suggests that agency is distinctive in that it consists in the exercise of a ‘two-way power’.
When an agent acts, she also always has the power to refrain from acting (Steward 2012, pp. 156, 160).
This suggestion by itself, however, does not help very much in the absence of a further account of what it
is to refrain from acting. For without such a story, it is unclear why a radium atom would not possess the
two-way power to decay or not to decay.
28 Certainly, those who are convinced that CTA is the correct theory of intentional action will not think
so. However, it should be noted that CTA is increasingly facing opposition from within the philosophy of
action. See, e.g., Thompson (2008) and Lavin (2013).
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Nevertheless, we have argued that a stronger libertarian position is possible and
worth exploring. The libertarian could argue that agency itself, instead of just free
agency, is incompatible with determinism. The focus of this more radical libertarian
should be on a discussion of agential control itself, rather than on a discussion of
extra factors supposedly required in addition to it. What the libertarian needs is a
theory of how action already requires indeterminism. Does it then follow from such
radical libertarianism that all intentional actions are free? This may seem implausi-
ble to some: there is clearly a sense in which someone who acts at gunpoint is less
free then someone who is not coerced. However, the radical libertarian can argue that
there also exists a more fundamental kind of freedom that is not gradual. That fun-
damental freedom she calls “free will”, and it is exhibited in every intentional action:
it consists in selecting a metaphysically open course of action on the basis of one’s
reasons.
Interestingly, such a radical commitment to a fundamentally indeterministic form
of freedom is rarely found among current libertarians. At the end of his Essay on Free
Will Peter van Inwagen, for instance, reluctantly admits:
It is conceivable that science will one day present us with compelling reasons
for believing in determinism. Then, and only then, I think, should we become
compatibilists. (van Inwagen 1986, p. 223)
Similarly, when Robert Kane is asked by John Martin Fisher what he would do if he
were to ever wake up to a headline reading “Scientist have discovered that determinism
is true”, he concedes:
If I do ever read Fischer’s future headline and it is true, I would give up my
libertarian view and perhaps go over to one of these other views. (Fischer et al.
2007, p. 181)
But why should the libertarian commitment to indeterminism be so frail? If the liber-
tarian truly believes that we have free will and that free will requires indeterminism,
she would be forced to deny that free will exists if science proves determinism. How-
ever, for the radical libertarian, this would also mean that science has disproved the
existence of action itself. And given the crucial role agency plays in both our self-
understanding and our engagement with the world, it seems simply inconceivable to
the radical libertarian that scientists will ever find compelling evidence for universal
determinism. Determinism might be possible, but not in a world that is inhabited by
human beings.
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